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__________________________________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the District of Delaware 
(D.C. Civil Nos. 1:12-cv-01715; 1:12-cv-01716; 1:12-cv-01717;  
1:12-cv-01718; 1:12-cv-01719) 
District Judge: Honorable Leonard P. Stark 
____________________________________ 
 
Submitted for Possible Dismissal Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) 
or Summary Action Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6 
December 5, 2013 
 
Before: RENDELL, FISHER AND GREENAWAY, JR., Circuit Judges 
 
 
(Opinion filed: January 10, 2014) 
_________ 
 
O P I N I O N 
_________ 
PER CURIAM 
 Pro se Appellant Roy A. Day appeals a District Court order enjoining him from 
filing, without prior authorization, any future complaint, lawsuit, or petition for writ of 
mandamus in an effort to avoid the sanctions imposed upon him by the United States 
District Court for the Middle District of Florida, or related to his 2009 conviction in the 
Circuit Court of the Sixth Judicial Circuit in Pasco County, Florida, for criminal 
misdemeanor stalking.  For the reasons that follow, we will summarily affirm the District 
Court’s order.1 
                                              
1
 We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and review the District Court’s 
issuance of filing injunctions for abuse of discretion.  In re Packer Ave. Assocs., 884 F.2d 
745, 746-47 (3d Cir. 1989).  We may summarily affirm if the appeal does not present a 
substantial question, and may do so on any basis supported by the record.  Murray v. 
Bledsoe, 650 F.3d 246, 247 (3d Cir. 2011) (per curiam). 
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 Day has a history of vexatious and abusive litigation.  See, e.g., In re Roy Day 
Litig., 976 F. Supp. 1455 (M.D. Fla. 1995).  Most recently, we affirmed the dismissal of 
five lawsuits that Day had filed in the United States District Court for the District of 
Delaware in an apparent attempt to avoid sanctions imposed against him by the Middle 
District of Florida.  See Day v. Toner, Nos. 13–2123, 13–2124, 13–2125, 13–2126, 13–
2127, 2013 WL 3481819 (3d Cir. July 9, 2013).
2
  We affirmed the dismissal of one 
complaint as time-barred, id. at * 2, and four on the basis of maliciousness because they 
were identical to the lawsuits that the Middle District of Florida previously found to be 
frivolous.  Id. at * 1.
3
  
 After dismissing the five complaints, the District of Delaware ordered Day to 
show cause why he should not be enjoined from filing any future complaint, lawsuit, or 
petition for writ of mandamus in an effort to avoid the sanctions imposed upon him by 
the Middle District of Florida, or related to his 2009 conviction for criminal misdemeanor 
stalking.  See Day v. Toner, Nos. 12–1715–LPS, 12–1716–LPS, 12–1717–LPS, 12–
1718–LPS, 12–1719–LPS, 2013 WL 1455449, at *5 (D. Del. Apr. 8, 2013).  After Day 
responded, the District Court issued an injunction precluding Day’s filings without prior 
                                              
2
The Middle District of Florida previously imposed a $4,000 fine against Day for 
frivolous filings.  See In re Roy Day Litig., No. 95-143, 2011 WL 550207, at *1 (M.D. 
Fla. Feb. 9, 2011).   
3
 These lawsuits arose from Day’s 2009 conviction for criminal misdemeanor stalking.  
We also affirmed the dismissal of two additional complaints Day had filed in the District 
of Delaware related to his 2009 conviction for criminal misdemeanor stalking.  See Day 
v. Ibison, No. 13–2121, 2013 WL 3722329 (3d Cir. July 17, 2013); Day v. Florida, No. 
13–2122, 2013 WL 3722330 (3d Cir. July 17, 2013). 
5 
 
authorization of the Court.  See Dist. Ct. Ord., Day v. Toner, No. 12-1715-LPS (D. Del. 
July 26, 2013), ECF No. 31.
 4
  This appeal followed. 
 A pre-filing injunction is an exception to the general rule of free access to the 
courts, and its use against a pro se plaintiff must be approached with caution.  See In re 
Oliver, 682 F.2d 443, 445 (3d Cir. 1982).  However, a District Court may enjoin a pro se 
litigant from future filings so long as the injunction complies with three requirements:  
(1) the litigant must be continually abusing the judicial process; (2) the litigant must be 
given notice of the potential injunction and an opportunity to oppose the court’s order; 
and (3) the injunction must be narrowly tailored to fit the specific circumstances of the 
case.  Brow v. Farrelly, 994 F.2d 1027, 1038 (3d Cir. 1993). 
 The District Court’s injunction was warranted in this case and complied with the 
requirements as set forth in Brow.  Day has continually abused the judicial process and 
was provided notice of the potential injunction and given an opportunity to respond.  The 
scope of the injunction is limited to non-prescreened filings against the defendants Day 
named in his seven previously filed lawsuits in the District of Delaware.  It is further 
limited to filings that are in an effort to avoid the sanctions imposed upon him by the 
Middle District of Florida, or related to his 2009 conviction for criminal misdemeanor 
stalking.  Accordingly, the injunction is narrowly tailored to fit the circumstances of this 
case, and the District Court did not abuse its discretion.  See Abdul-Akbar v. Watson, 901 
F.2d 329, 332 (3d Cir. 1990) (allowing the district courts to issue an injunction that 
                                              
4
 The order specifies that Day may not bring actions against the parties he named as 
defendants in the seven previous lawsuits he filed in the District of Delaware and lists 
each party individually. 
6 
 
requires a litigant to obtain approval before making further filings) (citation omitted); 
Chipps v. United States Dist. Ct. for the Middle Dist. of Pa., 882 F.2d 72, 73 (3d Cir. 
1989) (limiting scope of injunction to a specific case, when the vexatious litigant’s abuse 
was confined to that case). 
 Finally, we acknowledge that Day has filed a stream of documents in this Court.  
To the extent that he requests relief beyond what is provided for in this opinion, we deny 
each of his requests.  We note specifically that we deny his motion to disqualify the 
Judges of this Court because Day is not entitled to disqualification merely because he 
disagrees with this Court’s prior legal rulings.  See, e.g., Securacomm Consulting, Inc. v. 
Securacom, Inc., 224 F.3d 273, 278 (3d Cir. 2000).  We also deny his motions to 
consolidate and for transfer of venue to the Ninth Circuit. 
 For the foregoing reasons, no substantial question is presented, and we will affirm 
the judgment of the District Court.  See 3d Cir. L.A.R 27.4; I.O.P. 10.6.  Each of his 
pending motions and requests is denied. 
 
